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Hospital Flood Preparedness: A Survey of
15 Provinces in Central Thailand
Between September and November 2011, Thailand experi-
enced its worst flooding in modern history. Central Thailand
was severely affected by flooding, which resulted in the closure
of more than 30 hospitals in the region. Lack of evidence-
based practices, limited resources, and the inexperience of
infection control preventionists (ICPs) were obstacles to pri-
oritizing investment in infection control (IC) measures after
flooding. We conducted a survey to evaluate hospital flood
preparedness (HFP) in central Thailand and to guide future
HFP plans.
On January 6, 2012, a workshop entitled “Hospital Pre-
paredness for Flooding” was conducted with faculty from the
Division of Infectious Diseases of Thammasat University (Pa-
thumthani, Thailand) and Washington University (St. Louis,
Missouri). All 104 secondary care hospitals (1100 beds) and
tertiary care hospitals (1250 beds) in 15 central Thailand
provinces were invited to participate on the basis of a hospital
list from the Thailand Ministry of Public Health. Of these,
72 hospitals (69%) attended the workshop. A survey of HFP
plans was distributed to an ICP or a hospital epidemiologist
(HE) at each participating hospital. The survey instrument
assessed ICP, HE, and hospital characteristics; HFP; institu-
tional safety culture; and administration support to resolve
flood-related problems.1,2 This survey instrument was pilot-
tested by 10 IC experts, including ICPs and HEs, to ensure
its validity, reliability, and acceptability. The administration
support was categorically ranked as poor, fair, good, very
good, and excellent. The institutional safety culture was mea-
sured by safety score (a detailed description is provided in
Table 1). A higher safety score indicated greater safety cen-
teredness.1,2 Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS,
version 15 (SPSS). Adjusted odd ratios and 95% confidence
intervals were calculated by logistic regression to determine
factors associated with each HFP protocol and plan.
Of the 72 hospitals that attended the workshop, 72 (100%)
consented to study participation and responded to the survey.
The median age of the responding ICPs and HEs was 44 years
(range, 24–56 years). Eighty-nine percent of the respondents
(64 of 72) were ICPs, and 11% (8 of 72) were HEs. The
median amount of time that the respondents had been in
their current position was 7 years (range, 0.3–27 years). Char-
acteristics of the hospitals, HFP plans, extent of flood-related
damage, and infection control problems are summarized in
Table 1. Of the 72 hospitals, 27 (38%) had received flood
damage. The median institutional safety score was 8.7 (range,
6–10). Although the majority of the participating hospitals
had an HFP protocol (92%), only 52% had exercises to test
their flood protocols. During and after the flooding, signif-
icant proportions of the hospitals surveyed had plans for
opening flood-unaffected units for use (89%), had surge ca-
pacity planning (79%), had protocols to help hospital per-
sonnel and their families (76%), had plans to stockpile per-
sonal protective equipment (PPE; 75%), and had plans for
operating a laboratory unit (67%; Table 1). Notably, only
51% had plans for operating an isolation unit, and 32% had
environmental cleaning and mold remediation protocols. By
multivariate analysis, being a tertiary care hospital was as-
sociated with having an HFP protocol ( ) and havingP p .05
a plan for opening flood-unaffected units for use during and
after flooding ( ), whereas having an institutionalP p .05
safety score of 10 was associated with having practiced an
exercise drill for flood protocol ( ), having a plan forP p .006
adequate PPE stockpile ( ), and having a cleaningP p .007
and mold remediation protocol and a plan for operation of
laboratory units during and after flooding ( ).P p .04
Among the 27 hospitals that experienced flood damage,
the median duration of flooding was 30 days (range, 7–60
days), the median duration of hospital renovation (with units
open in service at reduced capacity) was 45 days (range, 7–60
days), and 63% (17 of 27 hospitals) reported good-to-excel-
lent hospital administration support (Table 1). The major
flood-related IC problems cited by hospitals that underwent
flooding included no containment of mold-contaminated ar-
eas during clean up and demolition (85%), no air sampling
to assess fungal bioburden (67%), unavailability of HEPA
filtration in flooded units during demolition (63%), and no
mold remediation protocol (56%).
Although the majority of surveyed hospitals (92%) had a
flood protocol, only 52% had conducted any exercises to test
their protocols. These data are consistent with earlier studies
of hospital disaster preparedness in various settings.3,4 Our
survey highlighted the need for national education on en-
vironmental decontamination, mold remediation, and iso-
lation unit operation after flooding, which deserves further
evaluation in resource-limited settings.5 Because Thailand had
previously been affected by an outbreak of avian influenza
and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the high response rates for
several aspects of hospital disaster preparedness (eg, stock-
piling of PPE and plans for surge capacity and operation of
laboratory units) were not surprising.6,7 Finally, our study
emphasizes the role of a “safety culture” in a hospital as a
strong predictor for HFP plans in this middle-income coun-
try.
There are some limitations to this study. With a 69% re-
sponse rate, our results have some susceptibility to nonre-
sponse bias. If the 32 hospitals (31%) that did not respond
to the survey were systematically different from the 72 hos-
pitals that did respond, generalization of our results to non-
participating Thai hospitals and hospitals in other countries
may not be possible. We relied on self-reported data from
table 1. Characteristics of 72 Participating Hospitals
Variable Hospitals
Hospital characteristic (n p 72)
Type of hospital
Secondary care 23 (32)
Tertiary care 49 (68)
Have an infection diseases specialist 35 (49)
Have a hospital epidemiologist 24 (33)
Safety scorea (mean, range) 8.7 (6–10)
Experienced flooding during October–December 2011 27 (38)
Hospital preparedness plans for flooding (n p 72)
Have existing flood protocol developed during and after flood 66 (92)
Ever conducted an exercise or drill of flood protocol 34/66 (52)
Have protocol to help hospital personnel and families during/after flood 55 (76)
Adequate stockpile of PPE for use during and after flood 54 (75)
Have surge capacity plans during and after flood 57 (79)
Have plans for opening flood-unaffected units for use during and after flood 64 (89)
Have environmental cleaning and fungal decontamination protocols during and after flood 32 (44)
Have plans for operating isolation units during and after flood 37 (51)
Have plans for operating clinical laboratories during and after flood 48 (67)
Flood damage (n p 27)
Affected units
Outpatient department 13 (48)
Central supply sterilization department 13 (48)
Inpatient department 12 (44)
Otherb 23 (85)
Duration of flood, median days (range) 30 (7–60)
Duration of hospital renovation, median days (range)c 45 (7–60)
Cost of hospital renovation in millions of USD, median (range)d 4.8 (0.5–12)
Good to excellent hospital administration support to resolve flood problemse 17 (63)
Flood-related infection control problems (n p 27)
Meeting and updating flood problems by hospital administration
No meeting or updating flood problems 10 (37)
Mold contamination and decontamination in the hospital
No mold decontamination protocol 15 (56)
No air sampling for mold bioaerosols in flooded units 18 (67)
No HEPA use before opening flooded units 17 (63)
No containment policy for mold-contaminated areas 23 (85)
Inappropriate mold decontamination procedures 12 (45)
Inappropriate method of equipment sterilization and disinfection 8 (30)
PPE
Inadequate PPE 4 (15)
Inappropriate use of PPE 4 (15)
Air conditioning ventilating and air filtration system evaluation
Unavailable specialist to inspect the systems 11 (41)
Bad odor before and/or after demolition and repairs 9 (34)
Waste management
No waste pickup by the designated authority 6 (22)
No separation of infectious waste from general waste 3 (11)
Administration support
Lack of understanding of mold-related problems 3 (11)
Lack of prioritization of the problems 2 (7)
note. Data are no. (%) of hospitals, unless otherwise indicated. HEPA, high-efficiency particulate air; PPE, personal protective equipment.
a The institutional safety score was defined as the average of responses regarding agreement to 2 statements about safety (ie, “Leadership is driving
us to be a safety-centered institution” and “I would feel safe being treated here as a patient”). The statements are based on a conceptual model
that seemed to best represent the elements of safety culture for the issue under study and our outcomes of interest.1,2 Both statements were scored
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The sum of the scores from both statements was the safety score, which ranges from 2 to 10.
b Includes emergency department, intensive care units, hemodialysis units, laboratory department, isolation unit, operating room, blood bank,
endoscopy suite, nutrition department, laundry department, and pharmacy and engineer department.
c Units open in service at reduced capacity.
d 1 USD p 30 baht.
e The administration support was defined by a composite response to staffing, financial, and political aspects from hospital administration.
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ICPs and HEs from each hospital to determine HFP. It is
possible that an individual respondent may have overstated
or understated how frequently HFP plans were used; however,
we have no reason to believe that this would be a systematic
issue. Finally, the small sample size might limit detection of
other factors associated with HFP planning.
In conclusion, we provide an important first step that sug-
gests opportunities to develop national guidelines on HFP
that emphasize issues relevant to environmental decontam-
ination, mold remediation, isolation, and surge capacity after
flooding.8 Additional studies that rigorously evaluate such
strategies would help bolster HFP efforts in developing coun-
tries and elsewhere.
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A Statewide Survey of Detection in
Massachusetts Hospitals
The prevalence of antibiotic resistance is increasing world-
wide. Although infection control efforts have largely been
focused on gram-positive organisms, concern is growing re-
garding more extensive antimicrobial resistance in gram-neg-
ative organisms. Carbapenems have been used increasingly
over the past decade to treat infections due to Enterobacte-
riaceae-producing extended-spectrum b-lactamases (ESBLs).
The emergence of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae
(CRE) severely limits antibiotic options to treat such infec-
tions.1 Moreover, it has been shown that patients infected
with CRE experience a 3-fold increase in mortality compared
with patients with infection due to susceptible strains.2
Because of the threat that CRE pose and the increased
reliance on automated susceptibility testing, it is important
to assess the prevalence of CRE and how reliably they are
detected. It is particularly important to know the current
variance in testing methods in light of recent changes in
guidelines for antimicrobial susceptibility testing of Entero-
bacteriaceae released by the Clinical and Laboratory Standards
Institute (CLSI) in June 2010 and updated in January 2011.3
Online surveys were sent to all 70 Massachusetts acute care
hospital microbiology laboratories and corresponding infec-
tion prevention teams in December 2010. Standardized ques-
tions were used to estimate the proportion of hospitals that
detected CRE in 2010 and to analyze current microbiological
methods for CRE detection. Hospitals were asked what plat-
forms were routinely used to work-up Enterobacteriaceae and
confirm carbapenemase production; whether laboratories
were adhering to the June 2010 CLSI guidelines; and what
carbapenem minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) cutoff
values were used to prompt CRE consideration. Data were
analyzed using SPSS software (SPSS) to calculate x2 statistics
and a Spearman rank correlation coefficient.
